



Conclusion: Future Anterior

He travels endlessly over that plain, without ever crossing the clear boundaries of difference, or reaching the heart of identity. Moreover, he is himself like a sign, a long, thin, graphism, a letter that has just escaped from the open pages of a book. His whole being is nothing but language, text printed pages, stories that have already been written down. He is made up of interwoven words; he is writing itself, wandering through the world among the resemblances of things. Yet not entirely so: for in his reality as an impoverished hidalgo he can become a knight only by listening from afar to the age-old epic that gives form to Law.

—MICHEL FOUCAULT, *THE ORDER OF THINGS*

My life had its significance and its only deep significance because it was part of a Problem; but that problem was, as I continue to think, the central problem of the greatest of the world's democracies and so the Problem of the future world.

—W. E. B. DU BOIS, *DUSK OF DAWN*

What sort of answers would one find if she addressed the founding statements of modern representation, questions that already presuppose “Other”-wise? If abandoning “discovery,” the routine of “normal science,” which all too often repeats “thus it is proved” kinds of statements (Kuhn 1970), the analyst of the social asks other, disturbing, questions—for example, ones that assume that Don Quixote is both “right” and “wrong,” that windmills were indeed knights, though knights could never be/come windmills. For such questions

to be imagined, the master account should not begin, as it does, "In the beginning, when God created the heavens and the earth was a formless void and darkness covered the face of the deep, while a wind from [the spirit, breath of] God swept over the face of the waters. . . ." Because it would have to assume that the writing of time as "the interiority of the subject itself and space [as] its exteriority" (7, italics in the original), to borrow Luce Irigaray's (1993) interrogation, has always already presumed, before the logos, the irreducible bar and the ontology it announces, which institutes and unsettles what the modern distinctions of "time and space," "soul and body," "right and wrong," "truth and falsity," "freedom and unfreedom" signify—something the analyst of the social should assume even if she could never recognize it.

When excavating the founding statements of modern thought guided by these questions, I found myself much like the "distracted" sociologist, Avery Gordon (1997) in her pursuit of the strategic naming of a critical sociological position that leaves the pathway of "discovery." Instead of taking the road to literature, I chose a sideway to philosophy, wondering whether my annoyance with historicity and universality, whether my hopeless inclination to ask "other"-wise, had led me astray. For I engaged interventions deployed in a moment when Western thought revered the "truth" of *nomos*, when reason was conceived as a constraining force, expecting to find statements that dismissed the illusions of poesis. What I found instead were statements that protected the mind's self-determination, with a deferential disinterest in rendering it an object of scientific reason, which left the way open for its appropriation in accounts of *universal poesis*. Had I lost my way? Perhaps, but most likely not, because, rather than the contradiction my reading of postmodern and postcolonial critics of modern ontology has trained me to identify, the one their moral embracing of historicity assumes, I met with an intimacy that explains why my rejection of the normative choice has led me precisely to the place where I had begun. For this reason, I abandoned my initial question—namely, What if modern thought had been "other"-wise, if it had always privileged exteriority?—because once I missed the contradiction I was destined to find, I learned that nothing much would have changed. My failure to grasp the difference between interiority and exteriority, I think, derives from the fact that this distinction "signifies" always already within modern representation, where it corresponds to the fields of history and sci-

ence and the two accounts of the self-determined thing they authorize. Hence, I could only but return to the least complex formulation of a more troubling question: If the distinction between interiority and exteriority does indeed belong to the ontological moment of globality—for Western thought has consistently accepted the view that the inside and the outside, the within and the without, are attributes of bodies, of extended (exterior/affectable) things—how is it possible that this distinction preserves interiority as the exclusive attribute of the *transparent* "I"?

Chasing the answer to this question, I traced the trajectory of self-consciousness, the figure who, by the end of the seventeenth century, had sent astrologers, magicians, witch doctors, and those engaged in the deciphering of the signs of the world into exile in the province of superstition, the figure which, because always already assumed, needed not be reasserted in statements that rewrote universal reason as a regulative or productive force. For had self-consciousness, the self-determined thing, the only one able alone to decide on its essence and existence, not shared a profound intimacy with a regulative or productive logos, universal reason, it could not have organized the "table of identities and difference," the "space of order" in the margins of which Foucault (1994) locates two figures that entertain contrasting relations to modern signification: the madman and the poet. When revisiting this epistemological configuration, moved by the questioning of interiority the racial cannot but impose on modern representation, I learned that the madman and the poet are the limits only because they constitute the two faces of self-consciousness. Never oblivious to the logos, if it is taken to signify a given order (rule or disposition, connection or world[ing] of things, the mind that misrepresents, the one that fails to communicate the proper meanings, still assumes that correspondence between words and things that defines representation; rather than being without reason and word, the madman represents according to other rules of signification. Nor does the poet, the mind who attempts to unearth hidden similitude, move beyond the boundaries of modern representation; otherwise the meanings it produces would vanish as noise, as a loss, and not as an addition to signification.

What neither the madman nor the poet follows, that which responds to their appeal to modern imagination, is the logic of "discovery," the stipulations (control and instrumentality) of scientific reason that consolidate but also threaten self-consciousness as :

thing of freedom. Nevertheless, as refigurings of self-determination, of self-consciousness that rubs against the protective constraints of the logos, the madman and the poet represent "pure" interiority only because they announce its (im)possibility. As the previous pages indicate, the figure of self-consciousness could not proceed without the logos, which, in the play of *nomos* or poesis, enables the assertion of the mind's ability to access the "truth of things," its ability to capture the manifoldness of the whole of created things with abstract symbols (mathematical and not). In the guise of a regulative (scientific, juridical) or productive (moral) force, universal reason has governed modern representation even as it has been divided into the themes of universality and historicity in attempts to ensure the privilege of self-consciousness in relation to other existing things. For this reason, the madman and the poet would follow distinct trajectories. The poet, the mind that reveals by rearranging signifiers, self-consciousness facing toward universal reason because—as long as poesis, this human productive yearning, does not aim to replace the divine author (as in the case of Frankenstein)—it remains within the boundaries of universal reason, from which it seeks to expand its ends or to (re)interpret its effects, as in Herder's account of universal poesis, where one finds the mind actualizing the principles it receives from the universal creator but never displacing it. Now the mind that represents according to other rules, self-consciousness facing away from universal reason, peering without the *nomos* and poesis, the madman (as Cervantes' wandering hidalgo) has been pushed to the irrelevant margins of modern representation as the signifier of a mind that comprehends neither space nor time. For what else explains why neither *productive nomos* (which locked away madness with pitiful abjection) nor *transcendental poesis* (for which madness does not even become a problem) has qualms, meeting the madman's admonitions with laughter?

Nor would the critiques of modern thought deployed in the second half of the twentieth century and their postmodern followers listen to the warnings of the madman, even though they owe as much to Nietzsche's attacks on reason as they do to Freud's use of the dreams of the hysteric to map the unconscious, Lacan's deciphering of psychotic speech to map a symbolic economy that does not need transparency, Fanon's account of the psychic effects of colonial violence, and Foucault's politicizing of the insane. For "post"

critiques of modernity, whether analytic or hermeneutic, challenge universal reason but embrace universal poesis, remaining well at the core of modern representation. In postmodern critical exercises, this limit appears in the privileging of historicity, which, as strategies of inclusion or ideological unmasking, will fulfill the promises it share with universality, that is, to reveal a "truth" that is but the other name of justice or vice versa, rendering the latter finally realized. My point here is that historicity cannot dissipate its effects, which in the case of postmodern strategies, are (a) an account of particularity as the effect of the universality of differentiation that institute "being" before any possible relationship that counts as political and (b) an account of universality that presumes the operation of ideological strategies that unite particular ("intrinsically different") collectivities at the level of "ideal equality," masking the "real" basis of their social existence, which is that these relationships are necessarily "political" (juridically and economically unequal).

Neither effect of historicity I acknowledge would hinder the formulation of global emancipatory projects, ones that would address the conditions of the racial subaltern subject, if transcendental poesis alone governed contemporary social configurations. In transcendental poesis, "Spirit" resolves particularity and universality, effect and cause, multiplicity and "inner force" in a narrative where temporality becomes the "essence" of universal reason; it reunites man and the things (of nature) by transforming the latter into moments of the trajectory of self-productive universal reason, which knowledge has the task of revealing, in the same movement that it reveals that individuals' actions and consciousness do no more than actualize the will and design of Spirit. From this derives the first effect of historicity in which the various particular collectivities indicate the contemporaneity of disparate stages of Spirit's trajectory fundamentally united in the transcendental productive force they actualize. Nevertheless transcendental poesis cannot fulfill the promise of inclusion because neither the transparent social conditions it describes nor the ethical principle they actualize, transcendentality, is global. Following eighteenth-century narratives of human history, Hegel's descriptor of the various stages of human self-development locates the final moment of the realization of Spirit within the spatial-temporal boundaries of post-Enlightenment Europe, when human consciousness and the social (juridical, economic, and moral) configurations reached

the moment of transparency—when they realized universal reason as freedom. Hence the second effect of historicity, which, though not immediately prescribed by, is congenial with Hegel's account. For if one begins with the assumption that particularity is but a manifestation of "a nonessential," "nonfundamental" differentiation—that is, if one assumes that all particularity is resolved in universality (regulatory/productive) shape-shifted into transcendentality—any use of difference to justify domination and exploitation does no more than to mask truth, that is, that any collectivity, every human being, constitutes but a manifestation of Spirit.

I am suggesting here that transcendental poesis does not sustain the boundaries it describes. For if the destiny of Spirit is realization, each and every social configuration and shapes of consciousness preceding post-Enlightenment Europe's world in time reach the moment of transparency. For such possibility to be denied, it was necessary to write post-Enlightenment Europe's particularity as something irreducible and unsubjectable that cannot be resolved or dissipated in the trajectory of the subject of transcendental poesis, but will be achievable only when the difference between Europeans and yesterday's natives becomes an effect of the tools of productive *nomos*. Precisely because they do not engage scientific signification, postmodern and postcolonial critics embrace the promises of historicity, oblivious to the fact that its limits do not reside on its margins, in the "other," which is another poet, the subject of another poesis, but in the "Other" (im)possible mode of representation that the speech of the madman cannot but signify. For this reason, the first move of this text was to identify in the symbolic moment of modern power the operation of scientific and historic rules of signification. I read modern representation as a text in which scientific strategies "supplement" ruling historicity. When deployed in historic texts, scientific signifiers both add to and supplement, constitute and interrupt, the *transparency thesis*. On the one hand, they simultaneously institute and interrupt the narrative of the transparent I that signifiers of exteriority constitute by adding, by making it possible to equate certain exterior, "objective" conditions to the realization of the transcendental temporal movement. On the other hand, they also delimit and produce the zone of operation of the principle of transcendentality, because, as products of scientific texts, they indicate a moment of signification when "science" coexists with "history," where "space"

touches the boundaries of "time," in which interiority comes being against that which it is not, that is, exteriority.

My argument in this book is that modern representation contains transparency, as the distinguishing feature of post-Enlightenment European social configurations, only through the engulfment of things, the inescapable effect of scientific reason's verity, while at the same time postponing that "Other" that it threatens to institute. To be sure, the importance of an element with scientific reason is already indicated by the very text that introduces the ideological argument deployed in postmodernism. It is in scientific signification that Marx finds the strategies of critique in the critique of the account of transcendental poesis as idealism, namely, the masking of the "material" (as opposed to "idealistic" conditions that constitute human beings as social dependent) things—a critique, it should be acknowledged, even by Hegel's limited resolution. For the consolidation of universality as transcendental poesis does not displace the *universal* in its scientific and juridical moments, because self-consciousness could not relinquish that which supports its institutive claim, the ability to know the "truth of things" and determine them. But also because, by resolving reason into freedom, the narrative of transcendental poesis introduces the symbolic, when writing nation, as a political-moral moment, one that, along with the legal and the economic, consists in a moment of actualization (riorization) of universal reason, as Spirit, the regulating/proximate force, the one that writes *homo historicus* as the subject of transparency by postulating the effect of the deployment of the *nomos* social conditions as the realization of poesis.

These gestures enable the emergence of scientific projects that introduce an account of universal reason as productive *nomos* ones that, by assuming the resolution of regulation into representation (productivity), perform the engulfing of nature with the exteriority that, subsumed to transcendental temporality, universality and exteriority become moments of a productive (temporal) projectively universalization and exteriorization. Hegel's resolution, which consolidates modern representation, also offers the project of departure for scientific rewritings of the figure residing in it, namely, *homo historicus*. I am not saying that it is the only way, though I have yet to locate a deployment of the productive

that does not in some way, directly or indirectly, engage Hegel's account. Rather, by pursuing this effect of transcendental poesis, I embarked on an analysis of modern representation that fully engages its promises and limits because I am convinced that the critical projects that have done otherwise, the ones that only partially engaged either or both, have but (re)produced its (highly productive) effects.

Perhaps the most crucial obstacle to postmodern critical projects has been the refusal to engage this predicament. If anything, our reflexive refusal to side with the madman betrays the intuition that any critique of modern representation should not abandon its grammar and lexicon lest it fall into risible oblivion. I wrote this text within the same constraint. For the mapping of the *analytics of raciality* results from a critical analysis of that region of modern representation, namely, the field of science, the one consistently dismissed by most contemporary analysis of racial subjection as the moment of "falsification." This mapping is not an easy task. The problem here is that undertaking this project, which is crucial if one wishes to capture the political effects of the racial, demands a dive into the reservoir of available critical strategies while at the same time avoiding their limitations. Far from the madman's but even further from the poet's, this critical position faces modern representation sideways through an oblique—from without but without dismissing (as falsification) the logic of "discovery"—engagement with the scientific projects Hegel's resolution both necessitated and authorized. For to capture the political effects of the scientific texts in which man becomes a thing of nature, the most powerful and efficient modern strategies of power because the most productive, one should recognize that transcendental poesis cannot dissipate their effects because it has rendered their deployment necessary.

When I began this project I had only a vague idea of what I wanted to accomplish. I was unsatisfied with how the concept of race was deployed in sociological studies that attempted to explain the social conditions prevailing in the larger collectivities to which I belong juridically, as a Brazilian national and a U.S. permanent resident, though race is so obviously a crucial dimension of their economic and symbolic moment. I was tired of statements such as "Brazil has a multiple system of racial classification, while the U.S. has a binary one," "Americans are obsessed with race, while Brazilians repress

it," "Unlike African Americans, black Brazilians have no race consciousness," and so on. I wanted to understand, but the sociological arsenal available could not help me. Although in both countries blacks occupy a subaltern position, one that stands before the principles, universality and self-determination, that govern modern juridical and economic dimensions. And yet, the political-symbolic moment of racial subjection appeared disturbingly different. Like other students of racial subjection, I knew that it had something to do with the relationship between race and nation. But I knew nothing beyond that.

From a sociological point of view—which is important here because that is my official disciplinary corner, I know just as much now. Yet earlier I failed to comprehend so many events! Events that are, to be sure, fully explained by what and how I know: another death of a black or brown youth at the hands of law enforcers; another death related to drug trafficking; another prison rebellion where many prisoners die, another suicide bombing, another leg act whose objective is to place more and more "others of Europe" a state of illegality. When I learned about them, I got mad. Because that which enables my "understanding" explains away these even (and the fear they entail), resolving them in neat sociological formulations that write the deaths I hear about and the ones I can only imagine as events foretold. Being mad is not bad, for, as Patricia Williams reminds us, being mad marks the critical position the racial demands. It is good to have company. I just wished there were more. When I read Gordon (1997) telling of the distraction that led her to "see" ghosts, I think of my inability to live with mine. These ghosts have first and last names: the ones I met as a child, others met just after they were born and are already dead, and the numerous ones of whom I will know nothing about either their lives or their deaths. Haunted and mad, I engaged in the project of mapping the trajectory of the racial, that modern signifier that delimits all the murders producing the *place* where the lives, the social trajectory, the racial subaltern subjects unfold.

My description of the effects of signification of the tools of raciality in narratives of the nation transforms these early modern political subjects into global subjects, specimens of *homio modernus* produced by signifying strategies confected in both domains of modern thought. What it reveals is that the writing of the teleolog

of the U.S. and Brazilian national subjects in transparency necessitated the deployment of the arsenal of raciality, which enabled the establishment of their political location while at the same time providing symbolic elements that can be used in the mapping of these social spaces. That is, it indicates that modern social configurations are the effects of political-symbolic strategies that defined who among the inhabitants of a given nation-state would inhabit the territory of transparency, the one governed by universality and self-determination. In other words, my mapping of the analytics of raciality shows how the philosophical displacement and negation of the human body in the institution of *homo historicus* was just one moment of the writing of the modern subject, namely, *homo modernus*. Moreover, the consistent deployment of the strategies of productive *nomos* in the delimitation of the place of the transparent I indicates the necessity of writing certain human beings as subjects of *affectability*; otherwise the frontiers between post-Enlightenment Europeans and their "others" would not be maintained.

And yet the transparency thesis has been rather powerful. Such is its appeal that the accounts that constituted the most radical critiques of modern thought have not escaped its logic. As noted earlier, historical materialism itself, which targets both dimensions of *homo modernus*, provides an account of emancipation, which is but the institution of "true" transparency, the moment in which the universally dispossessed proletariat overcomes the alienation imposed by liberal ideologies to seize the means and results of man's productive powers. Marxism's embracing of historicity limits its deployment as a basis for the projects of racial emancipation. For one thing, the assumption of a universal human being outside economic exploitation renders it impossible to account for modes of subjection that write human beings as fundamentally different. What I am suggesting here is that the idea of alienation itself presupposes transparency in that it wishes for a moment when the recognition of the productivity of labor, when the desire, will emerge for determining that the producers should enjoy the benefits it brings. Precisely because of its desire for transparency, historical materialism has been a rather limiting strategy for the writing of the racial subaltern as a subject.

What distinguishes writing of the racial subaltern subject is precisely the fact that the strategies of scientific reason, the racial and the cultural, consistently write its affectability. Here we are before

the moment of transparency but already when modern minds cleave a particularity derived from interiority and temporality. At this moment, Western thought learns of the universality of law (juridic and the universality of causality (scientific) which, it postulates, can be captured only by beings with reason. As suggested in Part I, the liberal account of the emergence of the political is premised on the certainty of the naturalness of regulation, for its earlier framers summed that the divine ruler and creator was the supreme regulator nature, including that of human beings. But they also assumed—a here I have in mind Hobbes and Locke, not Kant—that the divine ruler and creator endowed human beings with self-determinative that freedom is to act solely according to the determination of their will. It is here that the universality of the "laws of causality" and the presupposition of universal (God-given) freedom clash, a problem that Kant attempted to resolve with the categorical imperative which establishes freedom as always already determined by interiorized universal reason. What happens here is that universal reason becomes the foundation of a polity, for the authority of the state rests on democracy; and more importantly than playing its dominant role is protecting freedom. That is, as Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls posit, the sacrifice of self-determination is justified only in before (in both senses) the (creation of or a decision of) law there is no fundamental power differential (unequal ability to affect or be affected by someone) among the framers of the "social contract" that institutes the political society. For this reason, liberal political theory and legal theory continuously deal with the problem of exclusion and universality, for they are consistently called on to establish the grounds and reach of freedom and equality.

We know that freedom and equality have never been all encompassing, that the poor, slaves, and women were initially left out of the liberal founding "deal." However, this has not prevented us from demanding that justice be based on the idea of universality that is, as either demands for the actualization of or critiques of its pretended, universalism. Demands for both the economic inclusion of the racial subaltern and the denunciation of racial discrimination (individual or institutional) follow this pattern, for they consistently bring forth the "facts" of racism—that is, quantitative and qualitative sociological evidence of racial exclusion. Numerous sociological studies have shown that blacks share a tiny proportion of U.S.

American economic prosperity. The past and present determinants of this situation are known: the accumulated effects of the abandonment of reconstruction; segregation; the consistent explicit and implicit strategies used to deny U.S. blacks access to adequate formal education, jobs, and home property; and the flight of industries to the suburbs and overseas. Recent attacks on affirmative action, as we know, will just worsen this situation, for in the United States the view that only the descendants of Europeans show the necessary mental (moral and intellectual) attributes to benefit from prosperity has not gone away. To be sure, some Asian Americans have been given a share of it, but their fundamental foreignness helps rather than hurts the prevailing strategy of racial subjection, for now they can be used as examples that blacks, Latinos, and Southeast Asians' economic dispossession results from their own shortcomings, their intrinsic affectability.

Neither the liberal argument (nonsystemic or institutional discrimination) nor the critical field of racial and ethnic studies' focus on institutional racism touches on the most dramatic consequences of economic dispossession, nor can they apprehend recent resignifications of raciality. While recognizing that media-produced terms such as "gang banger" and "welfare queen" refer to the racial/gendered subalterns, they read them as codes for racial difference that mask the racially exclusionary aims of the legislation and policy initiatives these terms are deployed to support. The point here is obviously the relationship between racial and class subjection. How can we reconcile modern modes of subjection that have distinct referents, that is, economic position and racial difference? Surely the sociohistorical logic of exclusion explains this relationship, for it posits that racial subalterns will be maintained in a precarious economic condition, for they will not be able to compete under equal circumstances. The problem, however, is that the "gang banger" and the "welfare queen" do not participate in the U.S. economy, and the legislation (mid-1990s welfare reform and crime bills) and the public policies they enable displace them from the juridical moment as well, just as the *Plessy* decision displaced Southern blacks from the domain of the political, that of the U.S. Constitution and its amendments. What I am suggesting here is that to understand the contemporary effects of raciality it is necessary to address how it operates in all moments of the U.S. political configuration. To do so, one should consider

(substantive) racial difference not as the hidden referent of a racially conservative ideological strategy, which is successful in that it hides its racism using codes in the same way the sociohistorical logic of exclusion explains racial subjection away by attributing political effects to individual bias (liberal) or to cultural (racial) shortcomings of the racial subaltern subject. What is the strategy of racial subjection in the United States indicating that the racial explains class subjection but that the class explains criminality and material (economic) dispossession has a new signifier of the affectability of the racial subaltern. The gang banger and the welfare queen correspond to a rearticulation of the analytics of raciality, one that relies not on the science of man but on the very sociological strategies of the identification of the causes of racial subalterns' juridical economic exclusion.

Similarly, to comprehend how the racial and patriarchy strategies of subjection requires an account of how racial and gender difference signify affectability, that is, outer condition. No other figure indicates their combined effect better than the welfare queen, the single female who engages in unprotected and uses her children to remain out of work. Beyond the dismantling of the U.S. welfare state, this constructed economically dispossessed black mothers as socially entitled neither to the legal protections nor the remedial in civil rights legislation. The attack on these women's reproductive freedom—a right women of color elsewhere have never witnessed by the global population control projects along with the criminalization of black female drug users, enabled by their construction as "social problem"—indicates a juridical position that captures the protection, now under attack, ensured by the *Ro* (Roberts 1997). What is stripped away here is precisely what is, what in Locke's account of the *scene of regulation* enables self-determination remains a distinguishing attribute of the political subject. The criminalization of reproduction operates fore consent because the cultural and economic condition of black women become the sole determinant of the way that is applied to them. The concept guiding gender studies, precisely does not capture this political position because it assumes who can decide, act, and perform out of her own desire.

a transparent female subject who will emerge once the veil of patriarchy is lifted. This is a position that the economically dispossessed black mother cannot inhabit because in the various versions of raciality she is always already an outer-determined subject, one whose social trajectory is an effect of how the productive *norms* inscribes her biological, cultural, and social position.

Neither the sociohistorical logic of exclusion nor the notion of patriarchy can account for this particular kind of social subjection. Because both assume that the black female's subjection is an effect of her substantive difference, which becomes the point of departure for racial and gendered representations that support discrimination, the sociohistorical logic of exclusion and patriarchy fail to grasp how a double affectability locates the female of color before the moral (patriarchal text) boundaries of femaleness and the rational (juridical) boundaries of whiteness. My point is that, although the white female subject has been written in domesticity (as wife and mother) in the patriarchal (moral) domain, which has kept her outside the public (male) domain, the female racial subaltern has consistently been written to inhabit the *public* (non-European or non-white) place produced by scientific strategies where her body is immediately made available to a transparent male desire but where her desire (passion, love, consent) is always already mediated by her double affectability. The result is that she is constructed as the subject of lust; hers is a dangerously unproductive will because it is guided by nothing but that which human beings possess as being ruled not even by the "laws of [divine] nature," the preservation of life. Over the last thirty years or so, since the publication of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's (1965) report *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*, this construction has rendered the economically dispossessed black female an object of public policy, for she has been constructed as the subject of an unrestrained, unruly sexual desire that thrives in the moral degeneracy that proliferates in the dwellings of the black subaltern subject.

During the last three decades, the racial has undergone another resignification, the consequences of which become more obvious if one analyzes its effects on the juridical moment. With this I am not suggesting that the economic moment is irrelevant. My concern here is with how this reshaping of the analytics of raciality is placing large regions of the social and global space—the ones inhabited by

the others of Europe—together outside the domain of the operation of the law, with the result that people of color now inhabit a sort of "state of nature" to which the juridical devices that classic liberal theorists saw as necessary for the protection of life and liberty do not apply. My point is that it is an effect of the social scientific arsenal that produces the others of Europe as affectable consciousness which, outer-determined, cannot but actualize that which is exterior to the domain of justice; that is, an effect of the signification of the sociohistorical logic of exclusion is to keep the political-symbolic determinants of such events behind the veil of transparency.

What I see operating in the present global configuration are symbolic and actual violent acts that follow the letter of the logic of obliteration. Today's racial subalterns, finding themselves struggling for juridical and economic justice in an ontoepistemological context, globality, in which they stand always already before the ruling ethical principle of transcendentality, face the horizon of death existing in urban spaces marked by urban revolts, suicide bombings or drug-related violence or troubled by wars for the scarce resource and land riches of Africa, Asia and the Pacific islands, and the United States that insatiable neoconservative capitalists desire. We need to trace every and each articulation of raciality, including those that profess its irrelevance, trace at each moment how it rewrites the racial subaltern subject in affectability, producing statements that not only excuse the violent effects of this rewriting but also redeploy the transparency thesis.

What lies before those who engage this text? Halting our future anterior (what the global configuration "shall have been for what is in the process of becoming?"). Engaging it with critical strategies that will undermine the political or symbolic arsenal—the tools of obliteration—that are remapping the place of transparency by inscribing global regions and peoples that can be "rescued" through deployments of "total violence," recently renamed "enduring freedom."